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Abstract. A secret sharing scheme is non-perfect if some subsets of
participants that cannot recover the secret value have partial information
about it. The information ratio of a secret sharing scheme is the ratio
between the maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret.
This work is dedicated to the search of bounds on the information ratio
of non-perfect secret sharing schemes. To this end, we extend the known
connections between polymatroids and perfect secret sharing schemes to
the non-perfect case.
In order to study non-perfect secret sharing schemes in all generality, we
describe their structure through their access function, a real function that
measures the amount of information that every subset of participants
obtains about the secret value. We prove that there exists a secret sharing
scheme for every access function.
Uniform access functions, that is, the ones whose values depend only on
the number of participants, generalize the threshold access structures.
Our main result is to determine the optimal information ratio of the
uniform access functions. Moreover, we present a construction of linear
secret sharing schemes with optimal information ratio for the rational
uniform access functions.
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1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a method to protect a secret value by distributing it
into shares among a set of participants in order to prevent both the disclosure
and the loss of the secret. Only information-theoretically secure secret sharing
schemes are considered in this paper. A set of participants is authorized if their
shares determine the secret value, while the shares of the participants in a forbid-
den set do not contain any information on the secret value. The access structure
Γ = (A,B) of a secret sharing scheme consists of the families A and B of the for-
bidden and, respectively, authorized sets of participants. A secret sharing scheme
is perfect if every subset of participants is either authorized or forbidden.
Secret sharing was independently introduced by Shamir [35] and Blakley [6].
They presented constructions of perfect threshold secret sharing schemes, in
which the authorized subsets are those having at least a certain number of par-
ticipants. In these schemes, the shares have the same length as the secret, which
is optimal for perfect secret sharing schemes [22].
Blakley and Meadows [7] introduced the ramp secret sharing schemes, the
first proposed non-perfect secret sharing schemes. Their main purpose was to
improve the efficiency of perfect threshold schemes by relaxing the security re-
quirements. Namely, the shares can be shortened if some unauthorized sets are
allowed to obtain partial information on the secret value. The access structure of
a ramp scheme is described by means of two thresholds t and r. Every set with
at most t participants is forbidden, while every set with at least r participants
is authorized. In the ramp schemes proposed in [7], the length of every share is
1/(r − t) times the length of the secret, which is also optimal [29].
The threshold and ramp schemes proposed in those seminal works [6, 7, 35]
are linear, that is, they can be described in terms of linear maps over a finite
field [8, 23] or in terms of linear codes [27, 28]. Because of their efficiency and ho-
momorphic properties, linear perfect secret sharing schemes play a fundamental
role in several areas of cryptography.
Most of the works in the literature on secret sharing deal with perfect schemes.
One of the main lines of research is the search for bounds on the length of the
shares in perfect secret sharing schemes for general access structures. The main
fundamental problems remain unsolved and, in particular, there is a huge gap
between the known upper and lower bounds. Most of the known lower bounds
are derived from bounds on the information ratio, that is, the ratio between the
maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret. Such bounds can
be found by using the entropy function, a method initiated Karnin et al. [22]
and Capocelli et al. [10]. On the basis of the connections between information
theory, matroid theory, and secret sharing found by Fujishige [16, 17], Brickell
and Davenport [9], and Csirmaz [13], matroids and polymatroids have appeared
to be a powerful tool, as it can be seen from several recent works [2–4, 25, 26].
Similar questions have been considered for non-perfect secret sharing schemes
too [15, 18, 24, 29, 30, 33], but the research is much less developed in this direc-
tion. In particular, only basic bounds on the information ratio of non-perfect
secret sharing schemes are known [29, 30].
This work deals with the search for bounds on the information ratio of non-
perfect secret sharing schemes. Our main purpose is to further extend results
and techniques on perfect secret sharing schemes to the non-perfect case, with a
special stress on the use of polymatroids and the construction of efficient linear
secret sharing schemes.
Our first step is to choose a suitable way to describe the security requirements
of non-perfect secret sharing schemes. This description should be more precise
than the access structure. That is, in addition to the forbidden and qualified
sets, also the amount of information on the secret value that is obtained by the
other sets should be taken into account. We introduce the access function of a
secret sharing scheme (Definitions 1 and 5), which is a refinement of the access
hierarchies that are used in [24, 30, 33]. The access function is defined in terms
of the entropy function and it is a monotone increasing function on the power
set of the set of participants. The forbidden and authorized sets are those in
which the value of the access function is 0 and, respectively, 1. For all other
sets, the access function measures the relative amount of information on the
secret value given by the shares. A similar concept, fractional access structure,
was introduced in [18], but the partial information on the secret is measured
in a different way. The relation between these two approaches is discussed in
Section 2.
Our first result deals with a fundamental question. Namely, given a real-
valued access function, does there exist a secret sharing scheme realizing it?
By answering this question in the affirmative in Theorem 1, we generalize the
result by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [19], who proved that there exists a perfect
secret sharing scheme for every access structure. Our result is not entirely obvi-
ous since the usual approach of using linear schemes cannot work. Indeed, there
are only countably many linear secret sharing schemes over finite fields, while
there are uncountably many access functions. Therefore, some access functions
are inherently non-linear or might only be realized in the limit by a sequence of
linear schemes. Nevertheless, we prove that every rational-valued access function
admits a linear secret sharing scheme. If the access function takes non-rational
values, then our construction requires to take a non-uniform probability distri-
bution on the set of possible values of the secret. Similarly to the known general
constructions of perfect secret sharing schemes [5, 19], our general construction is
inefficient because the length of the shares grows exponentially with the number
of participants.
The main problem we consider in this work is the search for bounds on the
information ratio of secret sharing schemes for general access functions. For the
first time, we apply to non-perfect schemes the polymatroid-based techniques
that have been so useful for the perfect case.
The well known connection between perfect secret sharing and polymatroids
is extended to non-perfect schemes in Section 5. Our definition of access function
appears to be most suitable for our purposes. This can be seen, for instance, in
Proposition 3, in which the characterization by Csirmaz [13, Proposition 2.3] of
the compatibility between polymatroids and access structures is easily extended
to non-perfect secret sharing.
Two different lower bounds on the optimal information ratio of access func-
tions are discussed in Section 6. The first one is the extension of the parameter
κ [25] to the non-perfect case. The second one, which is denoted by , is in-
troduced in this paper. It is a lower bound on κ, and hence a lower bound on
the optimal information ratio. The value of  is 1 on every perfect access func-
tion, and hence this new parameter is relevant only for the non-perfect case.
As a consequence of Proposition 4, the parameter  improves the previously
known lower bound in Proposition 1 [29, 30]. We prove in Proposition 5 that
 ≤ κ ≤ n, where n is the number of participants. This generalizes the known
bounds 1 ≤ κ ≤ n [13, 25] for perfect secret sharing. As in the perfect case, the
upper bound on κ indicates the limitations of using only Shannon information
inequalities in the search of lower bounds on the information ratio.
Our main result deals with uniform access functions, that is, the ones that
take the same value on sets that have the same cardinality. They generalize the
perfect threshold access structures. Our main result is presented in Section 8.
Namely, we determine in Theorem 4 the exact value of the optimal information
ratio of all uniform access functions. Moreover, our proof provides a method to
construct a linear secret sharing scheme with optimal information ratio for every
given rational uniform access function. This is done in several steps. First, we
prove in Proposition 8 that every uniform access function is a suitable convex
combination of ramp access functions. As a consequence, the values of κ and
 coincide for the uniform access functions. Moreover, combining Proposition 8
with the basic concatenation method described in Section 7, one can construct
a linear secret sharing scheme with optimal information ratio (that is, equal to
the lower bound ) for every rational uniform access function.
Due to space restrictions, we only present the proofs of the main results. The
reader can find the remaining proofs in the full version of the paper [14].
2 Related Work
Brickell and Davenport [9] proved that every perfect secret sharing scheme in
which all shares have the same length as the secret defines a matroid. This
connection between secret sharing schemes and matroids was first extended to
non-perfect schemes by Kurosawa et al. [24], who characterized the non-perfect
secret sharing schemes that define a matroid. Recently, a characterization with
weaker conditions has been presented [15]. Similarly to the results in this paper,
its proof is based on the connection between secret sharing and polymatroids.
The polymatroid-based method described in [13, 25] is applied here for the
first time to find lower bounds on the optimal information ratio of non-perfect se-
cret sharing schemes. Some lower bounds on the information ratio of non-perfect
secret sharing schemes were found by that entropy-based method. Namely, the
one given in Proposition 1 [29, 30] and a lower bound for a particular access func-
tion [30] that proves that the bound in Proposition 1 is not always attained.
The almost-perfect secret sharing schemes introduced in [21] are schemes
whose access functions are close to a perfect access function. The possibility
of improving the information ratio by realizing a perfect access structure with
non-perfect secret sharing schemes with close access functions is explored in that
work.
Ishai, Kushilevitz and Strulovich [18] introduced the notion of fractional se-
cret sharing, which is a restriction of non-perfect secret sharing. The security
requirements of a fractional secret sharing scheme are described in terms of its
fractional access structure, which is a monotone decreasing function F : P(P )→
{1, . . . ,m}, where P(P ) is the power set of the set P of participants. Given the
shares of the participants in a set X ⊆ P , the secret is uniformly distributed
over a set of f(X) possible values. In particular, the secret value is uniformly
distributed over a set of m = F (∅) elements. Observe that F (X) measures the
number of guessing attempts, and hence the amount of work, needed by the par-
ticipants in X to find the secret value. The main results in [18] are the following:
every fractional access structure is realizable, and every uniform (or symmetric
in their terminology) fractional access structure is efficiently realizable.
The main difference between the approaches in [18] and in this paper is
that a fractional access structure fixes the size of the set of possible values of
the secret. The following observation illustrates this difference. Every fractional
access structure determines a unique access function, but the converse is not
true because an access function does not fix the size of the secret, but only
the ratio with the amount of information obtained by the sets of participants.
Being a more restrictive concept, the problems related to fractional secret sharing
are more difficult. In particular, our results do not appear to have a direct
application to fractional secret sharing. For example, no optimality result for
uniform fractional access structures (an open problem posed in [18, Section 5])
can be directly obtained from our optimality results on uniform access functions.
Another difference between the two approaches is the limited power of linear
secret sharing schemes when dealing with fractional secret sharing. Indeed, a
fractional access structure can be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme over
a field of order q (see Definition 11) only if all its values are powers of q.
Our optimality result for uniform access functions (Theorem 4) is closely
related to a recent result by Chen and Yeung [11]. They proved that every
(1, n − 1)-uniform polymatroid is almost entropic. By taking into account that
κ =  for the uniform access functions, that implies the result in Remark 6.
Nevertheless, the other results in Section 8, namely the value of the optimal
information ratio of all uniform access functions and the optimal construction
for rational uniform access functions cannot be derived from the results in [11].
3 Secret Sharing Schemes
In this work we consider the definition of secret sharing scheme that is based on
information theory, specifically, on the entropy function. For a complete intro-
duction to secret sharing, see [1, 31], and for a textbook on information theory
see [12]. We begin by introducing some notation. For a finite set Q, we use P(Q)
to denote its power set, that is, the set of all subsets of Q. We use a compact
notation for set unions, that is, we write XY for X ∪ Y and Xy for X ∪ {y}.
In addition, we write X − Y for the set difference and X − x for X − {x}. Let
X = {1, . . . , t} be a set and let (Si)i∈X be a tuple of discrete random variables.
We write SX for the random variable S1 × · · · × St, and H(SX) for its Shannon
entropy. Recall that, for two such random variables SX , SY , one can consider the
conditional entropy H(SX |SY ) = H(SXY )−H(SY ) and the mutual information
I(SX :SY ) = H(SX) − H(SX |SY ). All through the paper, P and Q stand for
finite sets with Q = Ppo for some po /∈ P .
Definition 1 (Access function). An access function on a set P is a monotone
increasing function
Φ : P(P )→ [0, 1]
with Φ(∅) = 0 and Φ(P ) = 1. An access function is said to be perfect if its only
values are 0 and 1. An access function is called rational if it only takes rational
values.
Definition 2 (Access structure). If A,B ⊆ P(P ) are nonempty families of
subsets of P such that A is monotone decreasing, B is monotone increasing, and
A ∩ B = ∅, then the pair Γ = (A,B) is called an access structure on P . The
sets in A and the sets in B are, respectively, the forbidden and the authorized
sets of the access structure Γ . In a perfect access structure, every subset of P is
either forbidden or authorized.
Definition 3. For an access function Φ on P , a set X ⊆ P is forbidden for
Φ if Φ(X) = 0, and it is authorized for Φ if Φ(X) = 1. Then every access
function Φ on P determines an access structure Γ (Φ) = (A(Φ),B(Φ)) on P ,
where A(Φ) ⊆ P(P ) and B(Φ) ⊆ P(P ) are the families of the forbidden and,
respectively, the authorized subsets for Φ.
Definition 4 (Secret sharing scheme). Let Q be a finite set of partici-
pants, let po ∈ Q be a distinguished participant, which is called dealer, and
take P = Q−po. A secret sharing scheme Σ on the set P is a collection (Si)i∈Q
of discrete random variables such that H(Spo) > 0 and H(Spo |SP ) = 0. The ran-
dom variable Spo corresponds to the secret, while the random variables (Si)i∈P
correspond to the shares of the secret that are distributed among the participants
in P .
Definition 5 (Access function and access structure of a secret sharing
scheme). The access function Φ of a secret sharing scheme Σ = (Si)i∈Q is
defined by
Φ(X) =
I(Spo :SX)
H(Spo)
.
In addition, Γ (Φ) is the access structure of the secret sharing scheme Σ. A secret
sharing scheme is perfect if its access function is perfect.
If X ⊆ P is an authorized set for Σ, then H(Spo |SX) = 0, which implies
that the secret values can be recovered from the shares of the participants in X.
On the other hand, the random variables Spo and SX are independent if X is
a forbidden set for Σ. In this situation the shares of the participants in X do
not provide any information on the secret value. In any other case, the value
Φ(X) determines the amount of information on the secret that is provided by
the shares of the participants in X.
Definition 6 (Gap and maximum increment). The gap g(Γ ) of an access
structure Γ = (A,B) is defined as g(Γ ) = min{|B − A| : A ∈ A, B ∈ B}. The
gap g(Φ) of an access function Φ is defined as the gap of the associated access
structure. The maximum value Φ(Xy) − Φ(X) for X ⊆ P and y ∈ P is called
the maximum increment of the access function Φ is denoted by µ(Φ).
Definition 7 (Least common denominator of a rational access func-
tion). The least common denominator M(Φ) of a rational access function Φ is
the least common denominator of the values of Φ.
Definition 8 (Uniform access function). An access function Φ on P is uni-
form if Φ(A) = Φ(B) for every A,B ⊆ P with |A| = |B|. Uniform secret sharing
schemes are those with uniform access function.
Definition 9 (Threshold access structure). Let t, r, n be integers with 0 ≤
t < r ≤ n. In the (t, r, n)-threshold access structure on a set P with |P | = n,
the forbidden sets are those with at most t participants, and the authorized sets
are those with at least r participants. The values t and r are called, respectively,
the privacy threshold and the reconstruction threshold.
A threshold access structure is perfect if and only if r = t + 1. Observe
that every uniform access function defines a threshold access structure. The
privacy and reconstruction thresholds of a uniform access function are those
of the associated threshold access structure. Ramp access functions form an
important class of uniform access functions.
Definition 10 (Ramp access function). Given integers t, r, n with 0 ≤ t <
r ≤ n, the (t, r, n)-ramp access function on a set P with |P | = n is defined by:
Φ(X) = 0 if |X| ≤ t, and Φ(X) = (|X|− t)/(r− t) if t < |X| < r, and Φ(X) = 1
if |X| ≥ r.
Example 1. A variant of Shamir’s threshold scheme [35] provides a secret sharing
scheme for every ramp access function. This construction was first presented in
the seminal work on non-perfect secret sharing by Blakley and Meadows [7].
Consider the (t, r, n)-ramp access function on the set P = {1, . . . , n}. Let K be a
finite field of size |K| ≥ n+g, where g = r−t is the gap of the access function, and
take n+g different elements y1, . . . , yg, x1, . . . , xn ∈ K. By choosing uniformly at
random a polynomial f ∈ K[X] with degree at most r − 1, one obtains random
variables Spo = (f(y1), . . . , f(yg)) ∈ Kg and Si = f(xi) ∈ K for every i ∈ P . It is
not difficult to check that these random variables define a secret sharing scheme
for the (t, r, n)-ramp access function on P .
The length of the shares is a measure for the efficiency of a secret sharing
scheme. We use the Shannon entropy as an approximation of the shortest binary
codification. The information ratio σ(Σ) of a secret sharing Σ = (Si)i∈Q is the
ratio between the maximum length of the shares and the length of the secret
value, that is,
σ(Σ) =
maxi∈P H(Si)
H(Spo)
.
The optimal information ratio σ(Φ) of an access function Φ is defined as the
infimum of the information ratios of the secret sharing schemes for Φ. A secret
sharing scheme attaining σ(Φ) is called optimal. The following is a well known
lower bound on the optimal information ratio. An alternative proof for this result
is presented here in Propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 1 ([22, 29, 30]). Let Φ be an access function with maximum in-
crement µ(Φ) and gap g(Φ). Then its optimal information ratio σ(Φ) satisfies
σ(Φ) ≥ µ(Φ) ≥ 1/g(Φ). In particular, the optimal information ratio of every
perfect access function is at least 1.
Definition 11 (Linear secret sharing scheme). Let K be a finite field and
let ` be a positive integer. In a (K, `)-linear secret sharing scheme, the random
variables (Si)i∈Q are given by surjective K-linear maps Si : E → Ei, where the
uniform probability distribution is taken on E and dimEpo = `.
In a K-linear secret sharing scheme (Si)i∈Q, the random variable SX is uni-
form on its support for every X ⊆ Q. Because of that, H(SX) = rankSX ·log |K|,
and hence
I(Spo :SX) = (rankSpo + rankSX − rankSXpo) log |K|.
This implies that the access function of every linear secret sharing scheme is
rational and its information ratio is rational too. For a rational access function
Φ, we define λ(Φ) as the infimum of the information ratios of the linear secret
sharing schemes for Φ. Clearly, λ(Φ) is an upper bound of σ(Φ).
Remark 1. The secret sharing scheme presented in Example 1 is linear. As a con-
sequence, the (t, r, n)-ramp access function admits a (K, g)-linear secret sharing
scheme for every finite field K with |K| ≥ n+g, where g = r−t. By Proposition 1,
this linear scheme has optimal information ratio, equal to the lower bound 1/g.
Remark 2. A (K, `)-linear secret sharing scheme with information ratio σ is de-
termined by linear maps Si : E → Ei with dimEi ≤ max{`, σ`} for every i ∈ Q
and dimE ≤∑i∈Q dimEi. Therefore, the computation time for both the distri-
bution phase (computing the secret value and the shares) and the reconstruction
phase (partially or totally recovering the secret value from some shares) is poly-
nomial in log |K|, `, σ and the number of participants.
Remark 3. Let Φ be a rational access function on P and let M = M(Φ) be its
least common denominator. Clearly, ` ≥M for every (K, `)-linear secret sharing
scheme for Φ. Therefore, by Remark 2, the efficiency of the linear secret sharing
schemes for Φ depends on M(Φ).
4 A Secret Sharing Scheme for Every Access Function
It is well known that every perfect access function admits a perfect secret sharing
scheme [19, 5]. We present in Theorem 1 an extension of this result to the general
case.
Remark 4. Similarly to the construction in [19] for the perfect case, our general
construction is based on a very simple perfect secret sharing scheme for which the
only authorized set is the full set of participants. Let G be a finite abelian group
(with additive notation). Let Tpo be an arbitrary random variable with support
G. Fix a participant q ∈ P and take independent uniform random variables
(Ti)i∈P−q with support G. Finally, take Tq = Tpo −
∑
i∈P−q Ti. It is not difficult
to see that T = (Ti)i∈Q is a perfect secret sharing scheme whose only authorized
set is P .
Theorem 1. Every access function admits a secret sharing scheme. Moreover,
every rational access function Φ admits a (K,M(Φ))-linear secret sharing schemes
for every finite field K.
Proof. Let Φ be an access function on the set of participants P . Let M be the
smallest positive integer such that dMΦ(X)e 6= dMΦ(Y )e if Φ(X) 6= Φ(Y ).
Consider the sets
– Ω = {dMΦ(X)e : X ⊆ P} − {0} ⊆ {1, . . . ,M}, and
– Ω1 = {dMΦ(X)e : X ⊆ P, MΦ(X) /∈ Z} ⊆ Ω.
We construct in the following a secret sharing scheme Σ = (Si)i∈Q for Φ.
We begin by describing the random variable Spo corresponding to the secret
value. Specifically, we take Spo =
∏M
k=1 S
k, where (Sk)1≤k≤M are independent
random variables with entropy H(Sk) = 1 that are described next. Let F2 be the
field with order 2 and let h be the binary entropy function. If k = dMΦ(X)e ∈
Ω1, take k = k −MΦ(X), which satisfies 0 < k < 1, and take Sk = Sk0 × Sk1 ,
where Sk0 and S
k
1 are independent random variables with support F2 such that
Pr[Sk0 = 0] = minh
−1(k) and Pr[Sk1 = 0] = minh
−1(1−k). If k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}−
Ω1, then S
k is a uniform random variable with support F2.
Now, we proceed to describe the random variables corresponding to the shares
of the participants. Take k ∈ Ω. Let Ck ⊆ P(P ) be the family of the subsets
X ⊆ P with dMΦ(X)e = k that are minimal with this property. Consider the
random variable
T kpo = S
1 × · · · × Sk−1 × Ŝk,
where Ŝk = Sk1 if k ∈ Ω1 and Ŝk = Sk otherwise. Observe thatH(T kpo) = MΦ(X)
for every X ∈ Ck. The support of T kpo is Fm2 for some integer m ≥ k. For
every X ∈ Ck, take the secret sharing scheme T(X) = (T (X)i )i∈Xpo described in
Remark 4 with T
(X)
po = T
k
po and G = F
m
2 . The random variable T
k
po is the same
for all schemes T(X) with X ∈ Ck, that is, all these schemes distribute shares
for the same secret value. The other random variables T
(X)
i are instantiated
independently for different sets X. For every participant i ∈ P take the family
of subsets
Di =
⋃
k∈Ω
{X ∈ Ck : i ∈ X} ⊆ P(P ).
Finally, the random variable Si corresponding to the share of a participant i ∈ P
is defined by
Si =
∏
X∈Di
T
(X)
i .
That is, the share of every participant is composed of sub-shares from the
schemes T(X) corresponding to the sets X ⊆ P such that i ∈ X and X ∈ Ck for
some k ∈ Ω.
Clearly, H(T kpo |SY ) = 0 for every subset Y ⊆ P with k = dMΦ(Y )e. On the
other hand, it is not difficult to prove that the shares of the participants in Y
do not provide any information about the other components of the secret value,
and hence I(Spo :SY ) = H(T
k
po) = MΦ(Y ). Since H(Spo) = M , this implies that
the scheme Σ = (Si)i∈Q has access function Φ.
Some modifications in the previous construction are needed to prove the
second part of the theorem. If Φ is rational, take M = M(Φ), the least common
denominator of Φ. The set Ω is defined analogously but in this case Ω1 = ∅.
Given a finite field K, take Spo =
∏M
k=1 S
k, where (Sk)1≤k≤M are independent
random variables and each Sk is a uniform random variable with support K. At
this point, a (K,M)-linear secret sharing scheme with access function Φ can be
constructed by using the same steps as in the previous construction. uunionsq
The above construction is not efficient because the information ratio is expo-
nential in the number of participants. The construction can be refined in order
to slightly decrease the information ratio, but no constructions are known in
which the information ratio is not exponential.
5 Polymatroids and Secret Sharing
The connection between perfect secret sharing schemes and polymatroids has
been used in order to obtain bounds on the information ratio [13, 25]. It is de-
rived from the connection between polymatroids and Shannon entropy that was
discovered by Fujishige [16, 17] and is described here in Theorem 2. In this sec-
tion, we discuss the extension of this connection to non-perfect secret sharing
schemes. For a function F : P(Q)→ R, a subset X ⊆ Q and y, z ∈ Q, we notate
∆F (X; y, z) = F (Xy) + F (Xz)− F (Xyz)− F (X).
Definition 12. A polymatroid is a pair S = (Q, f) formed by a finite set Q, the
ground set, and a rank function f : P(Q)→ R satisfying the following properties.
– f(∅) = 0.
– f is monotone increasing: if X ⊆ Y ⊆ Q, then f(X) ≤ f(Y ).
– f is submodular: f(X ∪Y ) + f(X ∩Y ) ≤ f(X) + f(Y ) for every X,Y ⊆ Q.
If S = (Q, f) is a polymatroid, then λS = (Q,λf) is also a polymatroid
for every positive real number λ. We say that λS is a multiple of S. The fol-
lowing characterization of rank functions of polymatroids is a straightforward
consequence of [34, Theorem 44.1].
Proposition 2. A map f : P(Q)→ R is the rank function of a polymatroid with
ground set Q if and only if f(∅) = 0 and ∆f (X; y, z) ≥ 0 for every X ⊆ Q and
y, z ∈ Q−X.
Theorem 2 (Fujishige [16, 17]). If (Si)i∈Q is a tuple of discrete random vari-
ables, then the map f : P(Q)→ R defined by f(X) = H(SX) is the rank function
of a polymatroid with ground set Q.
Because of the connection between polymatroids and the Shannon entropy
described in the previous theorem, and by analogy to the conditional entropy,
we write f(X|Y ) = f(XY )− f(Y ) for every X,Y ⊆ Q.
As a consequence of Theorem 2, every secret sharing scheme determines a
polymatroid. For perfect secret sharing schemes, this connection was first used
in [13]. This is a useful tool for the study of secret sharing schemes.
Definition 13. Let Σ = (Si)i∈Q be a secret sharing scheme on P . Every mul-
tiple of the polymatroid (Q, f), where f(X) = H(SX) for every X ⊆ Q, is called
a Σ-polymatroid.
Definition 14. Let Φ be an access function on P and let S = (Q, f) be a poly-
matroid. Then S is an Φ-polymatroid if
Φ(X) =
f(po)− f(po|X)
f(po)
for every X ⊆ P .
We say that a polymatroid S = (Q, f) is normalized if f(po) = 1. A polyma-
troid S = (P, f) is compatible with the access function Φ if S can be extended
to a normalized Φ-polymatroid S ′ = (Q, f). The following is a generalization of
a result by Csirmaz [13, Proposition 2.3] on perfect secret sharing.
Proposition 3. A polymatroid S = (P, f) is compatible with an access function
Φ on P if and only if ∆f (X; y, z) ≥ ∆Φ(X; y, z) for every X ⊆ P and y, z ∈
P −X.
6 Lower Bounds on the Information Ratio
On the basis of the connection between secret sharing and polymatroids, we
introduce in this section two parameters, κ(Φ) and (Φ), that provide lower
bounds on the optimal information ratio σ(Φ). The first one is a straightforward
generalization of the corresponding parameter for perfect secret sharing that
was introduced in [25]. The second one is only relevant for non-perfect secret
sharing. It makes it possible to generalize a previous result by Csirmaz on the
limitation of Shannon inequalities to find lower bounds on the information ratio
and, more importantly, to find a tight lower bound on the optimal information
ratio of uniform access functions.
For a polymatroid S = (Q, f) we define
σpo(S) =
maxx∈P f(x)
f(po)
.
If S is a Σ-polymatroid, then σ(Σ) = σpo(S). In addition, we define
κ(Φ) = inf{σpo(S) : S is a Φ-polymatroid}. (1)
Observe that, if Σ is a secret sharing with access function Φ, then every Σ-
polymatroid is a Φ-polymatroid. Because of that, κ(Φ) ≤ σ(Φ). It is not difficult
to prove that κ(Φ) ≥ µ(Φ) ≥ 1/g(Φ) for every access function Φ [15, 29, 30]. In
particular, this implies the well known fact that the information ratio of every
perfect secret sharing scheme is at least 1.
The search of κ(Φ) for an access function Φ can be restricted to the family
of the normalized Φ-polymatroids. The value of κ(Φ), which is a lower bound on
σ(Φ), can be computed by means of the linear programming program determined
by the Shannon information inequalities and the access function. This approach
has been used in several works on perfect secret sharing, as for instance [32]. The
infimum in (1) is a minimum and, moreover, κ(Φ) is rational if Φ is rational.
For an ordering τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) of the participants in P , we take A
τ
0 = ∅
and Aτi = {τ1, . . . , τi} for every i = 1, . . . , n. For a function F : P(P ) → R and
for i = 1, . . . , n, consider δτi (F ) = ∆F (A
τ
i−1; τi, τn). Observe that
∑n
i=1 δ
τ
i (F ) =
F (τn)− F (∅).
Definition 15. Let Φ be an access function on P , with |P | = n. We define (Φ)
as the maximum of
∑n
i=1 max{0, δτi (Φ)} among all orderings τ of P .
Observe that max{0, δτi (Φ)} ≤ Φ(Aτi ) − Φ(Aτi−1), and hence (Φ) ≤ 1. As a
consequence of the next proposition, (Φ) = 1 if Φ is a perfect access function.
In addition, this result provides an alternative proof for the previously known
basic lower bounds [29, 33] (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 4. Let Φ be an access function on P . Then (Φ) ≥ Φ(Xy)−Φ(X)
for every X ⊆ P and y ∈ P −X. In particular, (Φ) ≥ µ(Φ) ≥ 1/g(Φ).
It is known that 1 ≤ κ(Φ) ≤ |P | for every perfect access function [13, 22].
These bounds on κ are extended to the non-perfect case by proving that (Φ) ≤
κ(Φ) ≤ (Φ) · |P | in Proposition 5. Combined with Proposition 4, this implies
that (Φ) is in general a better lower bound on κ(Φ) than 1/g(Φ).
Proposition 5. Let Φ be an access function on a set of n participants. Then
(Φ) ≤ κ(Φ) ≤ n(Φ).
7 Concatenating Secret Sharing Schemes
We analyze here a simple way to combine secret sharing schemes. For each j =
1, . . . ,m consider a positive integer qj and a secret sharing scheme Σj = (Sji)i∈Q
with access function Φj . A secret sharing scheme Σ =
∏m
j=1Σ
qj
j is obtained by
concatenating m secret sharing schemes, each consisting of qj instances of Σj .
That is, Σ = (Si)i∈Q with Si = (S1i)q1 × · · · × (Smi)qm for every i ∈ Q. Observe
that H(SX) =
∑m
j=1 qjH(SjX) for every X ⊆ Q. Because of that, the access
function Φ of Σ is given by
Φ(X) =
I(Spo :SX)
H(Spo)
=
∑m
j=1 qjI(Sjpo :SjX)∑m
j=1 qjH(Sjpo)
for every X ⊆ Q. Therefore,
Φ =
m∑
j=1
ρjΦ
j , where ρj =
qjH(Sjpo)∑m
k=1 qkH(Skpo)
for j = 1, . . . ,m.
That is, Φ is a convex combination of the access functions Φ1, . . . , Φm. Moreover,
if σj is the information ratio of Σj , then the information ratio σ of Σ satisfies
σ ≤∑mj=1 ρjσj . For more details, see [14].
This leads to the following result, which will be used in our construction of
optimal secret sharing schemes for rational uniform access functions.
Proposition 6. For j = 1, . . . ,m, let Φj be an access function on P that admits
a (K, `j)-linear secret sharing scheme with information ratio σj. Let ρ1, . . . , ρn
be rational numbers with 0 < ρj < 1 and
∑m
j=1 ρj = 1. Let M be a positive
integer such that Mρj is integer for every j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the access function
Φ =
∑m
j=1 ρjΦ
j admits a (K, `)-linear secret sharing scheme with information
ratio σ ≤∑mj=1 ρjσj and ` = M`1 · · · `m.
8 Uniform Secret Sharing Schemes
Uniform access functions generalize the perfect threshold access structures. It
is well known that these access structures admit a linear secret sharing scheme
with optimal information ratio, namely Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [35]. We
extend here this fundamental result by determining in Theorem 4 the optimal
information ratio of all uniform access functions and presenting in Theorem 3 a
construction of linear secret sharing schemes with optimal information ratio for
all rational uniform access functions.
A uniform access function Φ on a set P with |P | = n is determined by the
values
0 = Φ0 ≤ Φ1 ≤ · · · ≤ Φn = 1,
where Φ(X) = Φi for every X ⊆ P with |X| = i. Therefore, a uniform access
function is determined by its increment vector
Φ′ = (Φ′1, . . . , Φ
′
n),
where Φ′i = Φi − Φi−1. Observe that Φ′i ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 Φ
′
i = 1. We use the
convention Φ′n+1 = 0.
Proposition 7. Every (rational) uniform access function is a (rational) convex
combination of perfect ramp access functions.
Similarly to the perfect case, every rational uniform access function admits
a linear secret sharing scheme with information ratio equal to 1.
Corollary 1. Let Φ be a rational uniform access function on a set P of n par-
ticipants and let M = M(Φ) be the least common denominator of Φ. Then, for
every finite field K with |K| ≥ n+1, the access function Φ admits a (K,M)-linear
secret sharing scheme with information ratio equal to 1.
Remark 5. By Remark 2, the efficiency of this linear scheme depends on the
least common denominator of the access function. Specifically, the computation
time for both the distribution phase and the reconstruction phase is polynomial
in log |K|, M(Φ) and n.
In the rest of this section we present a construction of optimal linear se-
cret sharing schemes for all rational uniform access functions. Nevertheless, the
schemes that are obtained in this way are not efficient in general because the
size of the secret value is too large.
Clearly, δτi (Φ) = Φ
′
i − Φ′i+1 for i = 1, . . . , n and for every ordering τ of P .
Because of that, we notate δi(Φ) = Φ
′
i − Φ′i+1. In particular, the value of (Φ) is
determined by the increment vector.
Lemma 1. Let Φ be a uniform access function on a set P of size n. Then
(Φ) =
n∑
i=1
max{0, δi(Φ)} =
n∑
i=1
max{0, Φ′i − Φ′i+1}.
Example 2. Let Φ be the (t, r, n)-ramp access function, which is uniform and
has gap g = r − t. The increment vector Φ′ is given by Φ′i = 0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ t or
r + 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, and Φ′i = 1/g if t + 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Therefore, δt(Φ) = −1/g and
δr(Φ) = 1/g, and δi(Φ) = 0 if i 6= r, t, and hence (Φ) = 1/g.
We proved in Proposition 7 that every uniform access function is a convex
combination of ramp access functions. The next proposition is a refinement of
that result that makes it possible to find an optimal secret sharing scheme for
every rational uniform access function.
Proposition 8. Let Φ be a uniform access function on a set P . Then there exist
ramp access functions Φ1, . . . , Φm on P and positive real numbers ρ1, . . . , ρm with∑m
j=1 ρi = 1 such that
Φ = ρ1Φ
1 + · · ·+ ρmΦm
and (Φ) = ρ1(Φ
1) + · · ·+ ρm(Φm). Moreover, if Φ is rational, then the values
ρ1, . . . , ρm are rational.
Proof. We use induction on the gap g = g(Φ). If g = 1, then Φ is a ramp access
function and the result obviously holds. Suppose that g > 1. Take n = |P | and
let t and r be, respectively, the privacy and the reconstruction thresholds of Φ.
Then g = r−t and Φ′i = 0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ t or r+1 ≤ i ≤ n+1, while Φ′t+1, Φ′r > 0. Let
` be the smallest integer satisfying t + 1 ≤ ` ≤ r and Φ′` = min{Φ′t+1, . . . , Φ′r}.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Φ′` = 0. Then t + 1 < ` < r and 0 < Φ` < 1. Take ρ = Φ` and consider
the uniform access functions Ψ1 and Ψ2 defined by
Ψ1i = min
{
Φi
Φ`
, 1
}
, Ψ2i = max
{
Φi − Φ`
1− Φ` , 0
}
for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Clearly, Φ = ρΨ1 +(1−ρ)Ψ2. Since Φ′` = Φ`−Φ`−1 = 0,
we have that Ψ1i = 1 if i ≥ ` − 1, and hence δi(Ψ1) = 0 if i ≥ `. In addition,
Ψ2i = 0 if i ≤ `, and hence δ`(Ψ2) ≤ 0 and δi(Ψ2) = 0 if i ≤ `− 1. Therefore,
(Φ) =
n∑
i=1
max{0, ρδi(Ψ1) + (1− ρ)δi(Ψ2)}
= ρ
`−1∑
i=1
max{0, δi(Ψ1)}+ (1− ρ)
n∑
i=`+1
max{0, δi(Ψ2)}
= ρ(Ψ1) + (1− ρ)(Ψ2).
Since g(Ψ1) ≤ ` − t < g(Φ) and g(Ψ2) ≤ r − ` < g(Φ) the theorem holds for Φ
by the induction hypothesis.
Case 2: Φ′` > 0. Let Ψ
1 be the (t, r, n)-ramp access function on P and take
ρ = gΦ′`. If ρ = 1, then Φ = Ψ
1 and the proof is concluded. Suppose that
ρ < 1 and take Ψ2 = (Φ − ρΨ1)/(1 − ρ). Observe that Ψ20 = 0 and Ψ2n = 1.
We claim that (Ψ2)′i ≥ 0 for every i = 1, . . . , n, and hence Ψ2 is a uniform
access function on P . Indeed, (Ψ2)′i = 0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ t or r + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
(Ψ2)′i = (Φ
′
i − ρ(Ψ1)′i)/(1− ρ) = (Φ′i − Φ′`)/(1− ρ) ≥ 0 if t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Since Ψ1
is a ramp access function, δt(Ψ
1) = −1/g and δr(Ψ1) = 1/g, and δi(Ψ1) = 0 if
i 6= r, t. Then the three values δt(Φ), δt(Ψ1) and δt(Ψ2) are non-positive, while
δr(Φ), δr(Ψ
1) and δr(Ψ
2) are non-negative. Therefore, Φ = ρΨ1 + (1− ρ)Ψ2 and
(Φ) = ρ(Ψ1) + (1 − ρ)(Ψ2). The proof is concluded by checking that Ψ2 is a
convex combination of ramp access functions in the required conditions. Observe
that (Ψ2)′` = 0. If ` = t+ 1 or ` = r, then g(Ψ
2) < g(Φ) and the result holds by
the induction hypothesis. Finally, we can reduce to Case 1 if t+ 1 < ` < r. uunionsq
Corollary 2. For every uniform access function Φ, κ(Φ) = (Φ).
Theorem 3. Let Φ be a rational uniform access function on a set of partici-
pants P . For every finite field K with |K| ≥ |P | + g(Φ), there exists a K-linear
secret sharing scheme with access function Φ and information ratio σ = (Φ).
As a consequence, every rational uniform access function admits a linear secret
sharing scheme with optimal information ratio.
Corollary 3. For every rational uniform access function Φ, (Φ) = κ(Φ) =
σ(Φ) = λ(Φ).
The fact that κ(Φ) = σ(Φ) for a rational uniform access function Φ, proved
in Corollary 3, can also be derived from [11]. The result was obtained indepen-
dently by means of different techniques. However, the computation of the explicit
optimal information ratio, and the construction of the optimal scheme was an
open problem.
The results presented in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 deal with rational ac-
cess functions. For some non-rational access functions, we can also apply the
techniques used in the proof of Proposition 8 and construct optimal schemes
(see [14]).
We do not have a general method to construct a scheme with optimal in-
formation ratio for every uniform access function but, as it is demonstrated in
the following remark, we can find secret sharing schemes whose parameters are
arbitrarily close to the required ones.
Remark 6. For every non-rational uniform access function Φ on a set P with
n participants, there is a sequence of rational uniform access functions (Φk)k∈N
such that limk→∞
∑n
i=0 |Φi − Φki | = 0. Since limk→∞ (Φk) = (Φ) and (Φk) =
σ(Φk), there is a sequence of linear secret sharing schemes (Σk)k∈N satisfying
Φ(Σk)→ Φ and σ(Σk)→ (Φ).
Nevertheless, this is not enough to prove our main result, Theorem 4. Instead,
the following proposition is needed.
Proposition 9. For every uniform access function Φ, there exists a sequence
of secret sharing schemes (Σk)k∈N realizing Φ whose information ratios σ(Σk)
converge to (Φ) as k →∞.
Proof. By Theorem 3, the result is obvious for rational access functions. Let Φ
be a non-rational uniform access function on a set P with n participants. By
Proposition 8, there exist ramp access functions Φ1, . . . , Φm on P and positive
real numbers ρ1, . . . , ρm with
∑m
j=1 ρi = 1 such that Φ = ρ1Φ
1 + · · · + ρmΦm
and (Φ) = ρ1(Φ
1) + · · · + ρm(Φm). For every j = 1, . . . ,m, there exists a
sequence of rational numbers (ρjk)k∈N with limk→∞ ρjk = ρj and ρjk ≤ ρj for
every k ∈ N. For every k ∈ N, consider αk =
∑m
j=1 ρjk and the uniform access
functions
Ψk =
ρ1k
αk
Φ1 + · · ·+ ρmk
αk
Φm and Υ k =
ρ1 − ρ1k
1− αk Φ
1 + · · ·+ ρm − ρmk
1− αk Φ
m.
Let s be a positive integer with 2s ≥ n+ g(Φ) and let K be the finite field with
order 2s. Since Ψk is rational and g(Ψk) ≤ g(Φ), by Theorem 3 there exists a
(K, `k)-linear secret sharing scheme Σk1 = (Ski )i∈Q with access function Ψk and
information ratio
σ(Σk1 ) =
m∑
j=1
ρjk
αk
(Φj) = (Ψk).
Observe that H(Skpo) = s`k. Moreover, we can take `k large enough such that
ds`kΥ ki e 6= ds`kΥ ki+1e for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 with Υ ki 6= Υ ki+1. From the proof
of Theorem 1, there exists a secret sharing scheme Σk2 = (T
k
i )i∈Q with access
function Υ k and H(T kpo) = s`k. The information ratio of Σ
k
2 is upper bounded by
a quantity νn that only depends on the number n of participants. Take positive
integers qk and q
′
k such that 1+qk/q
′
k = 1/αk. Let Σ
k be the concatenation of qk
copies of Σk1 and q
′
k copies of Σ
k
2 . Then the access function of Σk is αkΨ
k + (1−
αk)Υ
k = Φ and its information ratio satisfies (Φ) ≤ σ(Σk) ≤ αk(Ψk) + (1 −
αk)νn. The proof is concluded by taking into account that limk→∞ (Ψk) = (Φ)
and limk→∞ 1− αk = 0. uunionsq
Theorem 4. The optimal information ratio of every uniform access function Φ
is equal to (Φ).
References
1. A. Beimel. Secret-Sharing Schemes: A Survey. Coding and Cryptology, Third In-
ternational Workshop, IWCC 2011, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 6639 (2011)
11–46.
2. A. Beimel, A. Ben-Efraim, C. Padro´, I. Tyomkin. Multi-linear Secret-Sharing
Schemes. Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2014, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 8349
(2014) 394–418.
3. A. Beimel, N. Livne, C. Padro´. Matroids Can Be Far From Ideal Secret Sharing.
Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2008, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 4948 (2008)
194–212.
4. A. Beimel, I. Orlov. Secret Sharing and Non-Shannon Information Inequalities.
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 57 (2011) 5634–5649.
5. J. Benaloh, J. Leichter. Generalized secret sharing and monotone functions. Ad-
vances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’88, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 403 (1990)
27–35.
6. G. R. Blakley. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. AFIPS Conference Proceedings.,
48 (1979) 313–317.
7. G. R. Blakley, C. Meadows. Security of Ramp Schemes. Advances in Cryptology,
Crypto’84. Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 196 (1985) 242–268.
8. E.F. Brickell. Some ideal secret sharing schemes. J. Combin. Math. and Combin.
Comput. 9 (1989) 105–113.
9. E. F. Brickell, D. M. Davenport. On the classification of ideal secret sharing
schemes. J. Cryptology , 4 (1991) 123–134.
10. R.M. Capocelli, A. De Santis, L. Gargano, U. Vaccaro. On the Size of Shares for
Secret Sharing Schemes. J. Cryptology 6 (1993) 157–167.
11. Q. Chen, R.W Yeung. Two-Partition-Symmetrical Entropy Function Regions. ITW
(2013) 1–5.
12. T.M. Cover, J.A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory , 2nd ed. Wiley, New
York, 2006.
13. L. Csirmaz. The size of a share must be large. J. Cryptology, 10 (1997) 223–231.
14. O. Farra`s, T. Hansen, T. Kaced, C. Padro´. Optimal Non-Perfect Uniform Secret
Sharing Schemes. Full version. Available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/124.
15. O. Farra`s, C. Padro´. Extending Brickell–Davenport theorem to non-perfect secret
sharing schemes. Des. Codes Cryptogr., Online First (2013).
16. S. Fujishige. Polymatroidal Dependence Structure of a Set of Random Variables.
Information and Control, 39 (1978) 55–72.
17. S. Fujishige. Entropy functions and polymatroids—combinatorial structures in in-
formation theory. Electron. Comm. Japan 61 (1978) 14–18.
18. Y. Ishai, E. Kushilevitz, O. Strulovich. Lossy Chains and Fractional Secret Sharing.
STACS 2013, LIPICS, 20 (2013) 160–171.
19. M. Ito, A. Saito, T. Nishizeki. Secret sharing scheme realizing any access structure.
Proc. IEEE Globecom’87 (1987) 99–102.
20. W.-A. Jackson, K.M. Martin. Geometric secret sharing schemes and their duals.
Des. Codes Cryptogr. 4 (1994) 83–95.
21. T. Kaced. Almost-perfect secret sharing. Proceedings of 2011 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2011 (2011) 1603–1607. Full version
available at arXiv.org, http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2544.
22. E.D. Karnin, J.W. Greene, and M.E. Hellman, On secret sharing systems, IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory 29 (1983), 35–41.
23. S.C. Kothari. Generalized Linear Threshold Scheme. Advances in Cryptology,
CRYPTO’84. Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 196 (1985) 231–241.
24. K. Kurosawa, K. Okada, K. Sakano, W. Ogata, S. Tsujii. Nonperfect Secret Shar-
ing Schemes and Matroids. Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 1993, Lecture
Notes in Comput. Sci. 765 (1994) 126–141.
25. J. Mart´ı-Farre´, C. Padro´. On Secret Sharing Schemes, Matroids and Polymatroids.
J. Math. Cryptol. 4 (2010) 95–120.
26. S. Mart´ın, C. Padro´, A. Yang. Secret Sharing, Rank Inequalities and Information
Inequalities. Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 2013. Lecture Notes in Comput.
Sci. 8043 (2012) 277–288.
27. J.L. Massey. Minimal codewords and secret sharing. Proceedings of the 6-th Joint
Swedish-Russian Workshop on Information Theory , Molle, Sweden, August 1993,
pp. 269–279 (1993).
28. R.J. McEliece, D.V. Sarwate. On Sharing Secrets and Reed-Solomon Codes. Com-
mun. ACM 24 (1981) 583–584.
29. W. Ogata, K. Kurosawa, S. Tsujii. Nonperfect Secret Sharing Schemes. Advances
in Cryptology, Auscrypt 92, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 718 (1993) 56–66.
30. K. Okada, K. Kurosawa. Lower Bound on the Size of Shares of Nonperfect Secret
Sharing Schemes. Advances in Cryptology, Asiacrypt 94, Lecture Notes in Comput.
Sci. 917 (1995) 33–41.
31. C. Padro´. Lecture Notes in Secret Sharing. Cryptology ePrint Archive 2012/674.
32. C. Padro´, L. Va´zquez, A. Yang. Finding Lower Bounds on the Complexity of
Secret Sharing Schemes by Linear Programming. Discrete Appl. Math. 161 (2013)
1072–1084.
33. P. Paillier. On ideal non-perfect secret sharing schemes. Security Protocols, 5th
International Workshop, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 1361 (1998) 207–216.
34. A. Schrijver. Combinatorial Optimization. Polyhedra and Efficiency. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 2003.
35. A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Commun. of the ACM, 22 (1979) pp. 612–613.
